Une théorie physicaliste de la conscience phénoménale = A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness = Una teoría fisicalista de la conciencia fenomenal
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- Año de publicación 2011
- Idioma Inglés
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- This thesis advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which I label “ephysicalism”. It takes a realist stance towards subjective conscious experience: there are some entities such that there is something it is like, intrinsically, to be one of them (Nagel 1974). Firstly, I argue for a physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, I reject the thesis that consciousness is a supervenient property and, in particular, Strong AI and computational functionalism.Thirdly, I reject HOT theories of consciousness, address the “unity of consciousness”, and discuss the “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983). Fourthly, I argue that consciousness is an emergent property of conscious entities: it is, with respect to the micro-constituents of the emergence base, an ontologically novel property with original causal powers. Fifthly, I criticise Chalmers' (1996) “zombie argument” and Kim's (2005) “supervenience argument”. Finally, I argue that phenomenal contents are physical properties, and discuss Jackson's (1982) “knowledge argument”.
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Citación recomendada (normas APA)
- Reinaldo José Bernal Velásquez, "Une théorie physicaliste de la conscience phénoménale = A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness = Una teoría fisicalista de la conciencia fenomenal", -:-, 2011. Consultado en línea en la Biblioteca Digital de Bogotá (https://www.bibliotecadigitaldebogota.gov.co/resources/2084117/), el día 2024-05-07.