Columbia shuttle disaster analysis

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Descripción: This report provides analysis of the problems in Columbia Shuttle disaster in 2003 which is found in the article “Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures” by Barry Shore. Mainly based on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, information has been found that NASA was created as a governmental organisation which depends directly to the United States Congress and the White House. NASA culture at that time was arrogant due to the state of the art technology they had which convinced them they had the pioneer in the space industry. However, it has also been found that communication between teams or department did not flow effectively which unfortunately caused this Columbia Shuttle disaster. Moreover, evidences found to support Shore’s assertions to this Columbia Shuttle disaster which are conservatism, overconfidence, and recency. Based on those assertions, cultural change is suggested to deliver similar project effectively.
Citación recomendada (normas APA)
: Mario Jheinner; Aryan Bunbuarka Vargas Cubides, "Columbia shuttle disaster analysis", -:-, 2010. Consultado en línea en la Biblioteca Digital de Bogotá (https://www.bibliotecadigitaldebogota.gov.co/resources/2084724/), el día 2025-05-10.

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