Price Anchoring and Information Cascades in an Artificial Market: An Agent-based Computational Model = Anclaje de Precios y Cascadas Informacionales en un Mercado Artificial: Un Modelo Computacional basado en Agentes

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Descripción: Models of allocative and informational efficiency in Economics and Finance rely on the assumptions of rationality and utility-maximisation in economic agents, yet the tenability of those assumptions in actual large-worlds decision-making remains contested. In this work, an artificial double-auction market populated with Zero-Intelligence Constrained (ZI-C) agents (Gode & Sunder, 1993) is used to elicit information cascades by inducing a rudimentary form of price anchoring in the agents. Our results suggest that this simple bias in otherwise random behaviour accounts for a remarkable degree of aggregate market convergence towards buyers' private maximum valuation price, and could also be implicated as a triggering mechanism of more noxious cascades and bubbles in large-scale markets, phenomena seen to be at odds with the ostensible informational efficiency of financial markets.
Citación recomendada (normas APA)
: Enrique Alejandro Velasco Castillo, "Price Anchoring and Information Cascades in an Artificial Market: An Agent-based Computational Model = Anclaje de Precios y Cascadas Informacionales en un Mercado Artificial: Un Modelo Computacional basado en Agentes", -:-, 2010. Consultado en línea en la Biblioteca Digital de Bogotá (https://www.bibliotecadigitaldebogota.gov.co/resources/2081234/), el día 2025-05-12.

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