Por:
Andrés Eduardo Ruiz Espinel
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Fecha:
2019
In Colombia, the General System of Occupational Risks shows problems related to adverse risk selection. This phenomenon represents a market failure that threatens the financial sustainability of some Labor Risk Administrators - ARLs, which are forced to insure workers characterized by low income levels (expressed in Contribution Base Income - IBC) and high accident rates. Aware of this situation, the National Government between 2014 and 2015 implemented the monetary compensation mechanism, which sought to correct this failure, which affects since its inception the occupational risk insurance. To analyze this phenomenon and assess whether the monetary compensation mechanism and other controls implemented by the National Government were and are effective, the ARL was selected as a case study, which at the cut of December 2015 concentrated the highest number of sharpeners to the branch of occupational hazards with the characteristics described above. The concentration of affiliates and companies for each ARL, by economic sector and by level of risk was analyzed. In the end, it was determined that there is still a concentration of this type of insured population (under IBC and high accident rate) in the public insurer Positiva; while private insurers have large companies and affiliates with higher levels of income. It is concluded in this way that there are not yet enough mechanisms by the State that discourage adverse risk selection and, consequently, the ‘bad’ risks continue to be concentrated in the public ARL Positiva.
Fuente:
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Formatos de contenido:
Tesis
